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Abstract 
Whether the real estate development in China is overheated and whether there are bubbles 
in the industry is the focus of some dispute among researchers. However, they agree that 
real estate investment to some extent can promote China’s economic growth but empirical 
results on the intensity of the influence differ widely. This thesis uses the Input-Output 
Model to examine the driving effect of the real estate investment on the national economy. 
Based on time-series data of China’s GDP and real estate investment in the period of 1986 
to 2008, we also use quantitative methods, such as co-integration analysis and impulse 
response analysis, to examine the relationship between the real estate and economy growth. 
We also list some problems existing in the recent development of China’s real estate 
industry and provide some proper advice based on previous literatures and theories.  
 
Key words: real estate investment; economic growth; Input-Output Model, Co-integration 
analysis 
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Zusammenfassung 
Ob die Immobilienentwicklung in China überhitzt ist und ob es  Blasen in der Branche 
gibt, steht im Mittelpunkt der wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung. Allerdings ist die 
Meinung verbreitet, dass das Immobilieninvestment zu einem gewissen Ausmaß das 
Wirtschaftswachstum fördern kann, aber die empirischen Forschungsergebnisse über die 
Intensität des Einflusses variieren. Diese Arbeit benutzt das Input-Output-Model, um die 
treibende Kraft der Immobilieninvestitionen auf nationale Wirtschaft zu untersuchen. 
Basierend auf Zeitreihendaten des Chinesischen Bruttoinlandsprodukts und der 
Immobilieninvestitionen im Zeitraum von 1986 bis 2008, verwenden wir auch quantitative 
Methoden, wie z.B. Kointegrationsanalyse und Impulsantwortanalyse, um die Beziehung 
zwischen den Immobilieninvestitionen und dem Wirtschaftswachstum zu untersuchen. 
Diese Arbeit listet auch einige bestehende Probleme in der jüngsten Entwicklung der 
Immobilienwirtschaft Chinas auf und gibt einige Ratschläge.  
 
Schlüsselwörter: Immobilieninvestment; Wirtschaftswachstum; Input-Output-Model; 
Kointegrationsanalyse; Impulsantwortanalyse 
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1． Introduction 
1.1. Background 
Real estate industry is a new industry in China with only 20-odd year’s development. 
Before the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, real estate had a certain 
development but no historical data can be found. After that real estate industry has been in a 
dormant stage due to historical reasons. Since the reform and opening-up in 1978, 
especially after former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 1992, China’s real 
estate industry has developed at an unprecedented rate. Figures used to study China’s real 
estate industry were available since 1986. Relatively few studies on the relationship 
between China’s real estate investment and national economic growth have been made, 
especially few researches on reasonable investment scale, structure and risk prevention for 
real estate industry. Numbers of pressing issues have occurred in the development process 
of real estate such as high housing prices, land speculating, reform of housing system, 
social security and so on. Real estate is a fundamental factor of production and thus its 
trend of development relates to the health of national economy. Hence, how to use 
governmental macro controls to coordinate the real estate industry with the development of 
the national economy is well worth looking into.  
Concerning the problem of coordination between real estate industry and national economic 
growth, heated discussions with different views occurred. These discussions mainly 
focused on the nature of real estate industry, as well as its status and function in the national 
economy. Issues such as the intensity of macroeconomic regulation and control, the 
management system of real estate and housing system reform also have become issues. It 
was widely recognized that China should borrow the experience of developed countries and 
make a systematic study for real estate industry based on the concrete conditions of China.  
1.2. Related Literature 
The well-known American scholars M. Ball and T. Morrison (1995) have analyzed and 
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summarized the internal relationship between real estate development and national 
economic growth by doing researches on housing investment in many countries. They have 
come to the conclusion that there is an internal relation between housing investment and 
per capita GDP as a general rule: if per capita GDP is below 500 U.S. Dollars, the share of 
housing investment in GDP should be less than 2%; if per capita GDP reaches 2500 U.S. 
Dollars, the ratio is about 3-5%; If per capita GDP reaches or exceeds 5000 U.S. Dollars, 
the ratio can be up to 6-7%. The absolute value of housing investment hereafter increases 
as per capita GDP increases, but the ratio in GDP has a downward trend. This is the 
well-known inverted U curve.  
Green (1997) tested the relationship between American real estate investment and 
economic growth for the period 1959 to 1992 under a wide variety of time-series 
specifications and concluded that residential investment causes, but is not caused by GDP. 
Kim (2002) used a VAR model, based on data from 1970 to 2000 of Korea, to examine 
whether residential and non-residential investment cause GDP growth and whether GDP 
growth causes these types of investment. The result shows that non-residential investment 
has greater impact on national economic growth than residential investment.   
Pi and Wu (2004) used Granger causality tests to examine the internal relationship between 
China’s real estate investment in specific areas and economic growth of these areas for the 
period 1994 to 2002 and found that there was reciprocal causation between them. Gong and 
Chen (2006) did the test based on the same figures and obtained the same result, but they 
emphasized that their impacts on each other will be more significant and stable in the 
long-run. Shen and Liu (2004) examined the relationship between China’s total completed 
real estate investment and GDP and concluded that national economic growth does Granger 
cause, but is not caused by real estate investment.  
Yue and Sun (2006) made quantitative analysis on the co-integration relationship between 
China’s real estate investment and national economic growth, based on the data for the 
period 1991-2004. They came to three conclusions: first, there was long-term co-integration 
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relationship between real estate investment and national economic growth; second, 
short-term fluctuation of real estate investment had positively significant impact on national 
economic growth; third, the causal relation between them would change from 
unidirectional to reciprocal in the short-run as the significance level increased.  
Wang and Liu (2004) computed the driving impact of real estate industry on its related 
industries based on China’s Input-output Table (2002). They obtained for the driving 
coefficient of real estate industry to its related industries a value of 1.42, which indicates 
that every 1 RMB of real estate investment would lead to 1.42 RMB of production in 
related industries.  In 2006, a research group from the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, led by Liu Shuixing, came to the result that every unit of output in the real estate 
industry can drive a demand of 2.15 units for other industry.  
Yan and Feng (2007) use input-output tables of China (2002), the United States (2002) and 
Japan (2000) to compare the driving impact of real estate on other industries in these 
countries. They showed that the driving impact of real estate on national economy was 
weak in all of these countries and that real estate industry was marked as an industry with 
high added-value but low driving impact. 
1.3. Problems in the Existing Literature 
Compared with many developed countries, China’s research on real estate industry was still 
in its infancy and did not provide uniform results concerning the contribution degree of real 
estate industry to national economic growth. Some scholars even confused the concept of 
real estate with construction industry intentionally and obtained a result that exaggerates 
the contribution of real estate industry to China’s national economic growth (Yan, 2008). In 
the meanwhile, due to the short history of the development of China’s real estate industry, 
figures used for research are insufficient. As the results of these existing studies vary, it is 
meaningful to examine the relationship between real estate investment and national 
economic growth again by using latest figures.  
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1.4. Structure  
The first part of this paper gives a short overview to the incentive of this paper and lists 
some existing literatures on the relationship between China’s real estate investment and 
economic growth. The second introduces the development process of China’s real estate 
industry from 1986 to 2008 from an historical aspect. The third part introduces major 
factors that directly influence the real estate investment. The fourth part uses the 
Input-Output Model Analysis and quantitative analysis based on cointergration theory to 
examine the relationship between China’s real estate investment and economic growth. In 
the fifth part, we list some problems existing in the real estate industry of China, 
particularly the issues of high housing prices and inefficient housing security system. We 
also make some recommendations based on former studies and conclude this paper in the 
sixth part.  
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2. The Development Process of Real Estate Investment in China 
Figure 1: The ratio of real estate investment completed to GDP  
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of real estate investment completed in GDP, using sorted 
annual data (unit: percentage) from 1986 to 2008. The ratio of completed real estate 
investment denotes the completed investment cost of enterprises for real estate 
development (land and buildings), which is an indicator reflecting the scale of real estate 
investment and acts as guidance in the turn of the market. The figure shows the small ratio 
of real estate investment to GDP in the years of 1986 to 1991, not more than 2%. In this 
period, China started the urban housing system reform, at that time there is lack of active 
participation of both relevant units for selling and employees for buying houses. Besides, 
the imperfect rules and regulations on housing also lead to the small amount of real estate 
investment, corresponding to the small ratio to GDP of China.  
The year of 1992 is a historical turning point of Chinese real estate development. Since 
1992 when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Tour
1
 and reinvigorated the reform process, 
the real estate sector has been developing rapidly under advantageous circumstance for 
politic and economies. China turned to the period of rapid expansion in the real estate 
sector over the country. This expansion period lasts till 1993. Figure 1 shows that the real 
                                                             
1
China has experienced explosive growth in the last 25 years, which should be ascribed to the success of economic 
reforms and opening up. This process of gradual opening up has been characterized by many stages, most of which can 
be accredited to China’s leader Deng Xiaoping. As China’s then helmsman, Deng delivered several important speeches in 
his Southern Tour in 1992 that dismissed leftist ideology and conservative thinking and called for further economic 
reform boldly. His arguments and ideas would later triumph and pave the way for China’s further development and 
success.  
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estate investment ration to GDP of 1993 races up to 5.5%, this to a certain extent has 
pushed the development of real estate sector. However, it has also resulted in a number of 
problems, such as excessive land supply, no reasonable structure of real estate investment, 
nonstandard market behavior, too large scale of real estate development, etc. Since July of 
1993, the central government sets up its policy of macro regulation and control and Chinese 
real estate investment has entered into a new stage of adjustment. During the following 
years, the ratio of Chinese real estate investment to GDP was affected by macro regulation 
and suffered some contractions, decreasing to 4.02% in 1997. 
In 1998, to protect Chinese economies against the impact of the Asian financial crisis, 
China adopted a policy of increasing investment in construction of residential houses and 
speeding up residential houses reform, leading to the rapid development of real estate 
investment.  Since 1998, based on housing construction, China’s real estate industry on 
one hand has accelerated economic growth and employment; on the other hand, it also has 
benefited from the sustained and rapid growth of national economics and residential 
income, as well as the quickening of the progress of urbanization. 
By 2008, the completed real estate total investment reached 3120.32 billion Yuan, growing 
by 30.2% as compared to the previous year. The contribution rate of real estate industry in 
GDP growth was up to 23.39%. 
These data show that the flourishing development of real estate industry might have 
provided a powerful guarantee for the growth of national economics and become one of the 
pillar industries in China. Besides, as one of pillar industries, real estate has long industry 
chain, high correlation degree and capability to drive the development of related industries, 
especially steel, building materials, metallurgical and textiles industries. At the same time, 
more jobs are created while China is confronting a severe challenge on issues of 
unemployment. Accordingly, the real estate industry has become more and more important 
in the national economy. 
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3. The status quo of China’s Real Estate Investment 
3.1. Subjects of China’s Real Estate Investment 
In the traditional planned economic system before reform, China used to develop her 
national economy in a completely planned manner. The state is the source of all economic 
investments, as in real estate industry. China used to allocate economic resources in society 
based on a planned socialist economy on a nationwide scale.  
Although the real estate industry in the planned economic system once could satisfy the 
need of residents, however, from the view of industry development, the planned economic 
system has stifled the development of a real estate market. With the progress of history, the 
old system became inadaptable to the requirements of economic and social development.  
Since China adopted the policy of reform of the urban housing system in 1992, enterprises 
and individuals also have become sources of real estate investment, promoting rapid and 
sustained development of real estate industry. At present, the main sources of real estate 
investment in China are the state, banks, enterprises, public institutions and individuals as 
well as foreign merchants. 
3.2. Capital Sources of China’s Real Estate Investment 
Generally, investment funds of the real estate in China are raised through five channels: 
enterprises’ own funds, credit funds, fund-raising, presale revenues and earnest money, 
foreign capital and financial funds.  
Enterprises’ own fund includes the self-accumulated funds, funds provided by relevant 
administrative departments and joint enterprises. According to the Law of Urban Housing 
and Land in China, the proportion of registered capital by real estate enterprises to their 
total investment shall be more than 30%. Credit funds refer to loans by real estate investors 
from banks and non-bank financial institutions and repaid with principal and interest when 
it’s due. 
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Fund-raising refers to idle capitals collected by real estate investors from the society, e.g. 
the issuance of bond and stock by real estate enterprises, revenues from external units. 
Presale revenue denotes that real estate investors collect the sales revenues in advance 
before the real estate building project is completed, which could provide funds for later 
investment in real estate. Earnest money is partial payment paid by contractors in advance 
for the real estate project so that they can obtain the task of real estate construction. 
Foreign capital refers to the capital invested by foreign governments, foreign consortia or 
foreign individuals, including joint venture, cooperation, equity, loans, bonds, direct 
investment and etc.  
Financial funds for real estate investment in China are generally provided in the form of 
loans and are not allowed to use for other purposes. Both the principal and the interest are 
refunded after the use of financial funds. However, financial funds invested for some areas 
are used without compensation, such as for the purpose of national defense and scientific 
research as well as the construction of public houses. 
Table 1: Sources of Funds of Enterprises for Real Estate Development（1997-2008） 
Unit: billion RMB 
Year 
     
Others 
Total Domestic Foreign 
Foreign Direct 
Self-raising 
Funds Loans Investment Funds 
This Year 
  
Investment 
 
1997 379.97 91.12 46.09 32.79 97.29 145.48 
1998 439.38 105.32 36.18 25.89 116.70 181.19 
1999 477.60 111.16 25.66 18.05 134.46 206.32 
2000 598.73 138.51 16.87 13.48 161.42 281.93 
2001 768.24 169.22 13.57 10.61 218.40 367.06 
2002 973.59 222.03 15.72 12.41 273.84 461.99 
2003 1318.50 313.83 17.00 11.63 377.07 610.61 
2004 1715.68 315.84 22.82 14.26 520.76 856.26 
2005 2139.78 391.81 25.78 17.14 700.04 1022.16 
2006 2713.56 535.70 40.02 30.30 859.71 1278.13 
2007 3747.80 701.56 64.10 48.54 1177.25 1804.88 
2008 3961.94 760.57 72.82 63.50 1531.21 1597.34 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
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Table 1 shows different sources and amount of funds for real estate investment in the period 
of 1997 to 2008. Calculating the average annual growth rate of total funds for real estate 
investment and its individual types of capital source based on the figures form Table1, we 
find that the total funds of enterprises for China’s real estate development had an averagely 
annual growth rate of 24.15%, domestic loans annually increased by 21.93%, foreign 
investment by 8.71%, foreign direct investment by 11.21%, self-raising funds by 28.72%, 
other kinds of sources by 25.24%. 
Table 2: Sources of Funds of Enterprises for Real Estate Development (1997-2008) Unit: % 
Year 
          
Others 
Total Domestic Foreign Foreign 
Direct 
Self-raising 
  Funds Loans Investment Funds 
This Year     Investment   
1997 100 23.98 12.13 8.63 25.60 38.29 
1998 100 23.97 8.23 5.89 26.56 41.24 
1999 100 23.27 5.37 3.78 28.15 43.20 
2000 100 23.13 2.82 2.25 26.96 47.09 
2001 100 22.03 1.77 1.38 28.43 47.78 
2002 100 22.81 1.61 1.27 28.13 47.45 
2003 100 23.80 1.29 0.88 28.60 46.31 
2004 100 18.41 1.33 0.83 30.35 49.91 
2005 100 18.31 1.20 0.80 32.72 47.77 
2006 100 19.74 1.47 1.12 31.68 47.10 
2007 100 18.72 1.71 1.30 31.41 48.16 
2008 100 19.20 1.84 1.60 38.65 40.32 
Table 2 is the percentage of every single type of capital sources to the total funds in the 
year calculated based on figures from Table 1. The change of proportion indicates the 
development trend of capital structure. We find that from 1997 to 2008, domestic loans still 
act as an important part of sources of funds for real estate development, but decreased from 
a ratio of 23.98% in 1997 down to 19.2% in 2008; self-raising and other forms of capital 
sources all increased rapidly have become the key components of capital sources for 
China’s real estate investment, they increased from 25.60% to 38.65% and from 38.29% to 
40.32%, respectively.   
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However, a big part of self-raising fund and other forms of funds derives directly or 
indirectly from banks. In some areas, up to 80% of this capital comes from bank (Wang, 
2007). In early 2010, the Central Bank admitted in a report that estate development depends 
too much on loans which lead to high risks of banks. 
3.3. The Scale of China’s Real Estate Investment 
The scale of real estate investment is an important aspect to test the reasonability of real 
estate investment in a certain range, which is also an important criterion for determining 
whether a bubble exists in the real estate market. In order to understand the scale of 
investment in real estate more intuitively, we evaluations are made with following 
indicators: the total investment amount, the ratio of investment to GDP and growth rate of 
housing price.  
3.3.1. Real Estate Investment Amount 
The total amount of investment in real estate denotes the overall scale and level of 
investment in the sector. Table 3 shows completed investment from 1986 to 2007. Figure 2 
is drawn according to the data from Table 3. 
Table 3:  China’s investment in real estate (1988~ 2007)   Unit：billion RMB 
Year Investment amount Year Investment amount 
1986 10.1 1998 361.42 
1987 14.99 1999 410.32 
1988 25.72 2000 498.41 
1989 27.23 2001 634.41 
1990 25.33 2002 779.09 
1991 33.62 2003 1015.38 
1992 73.12 2004 1315.83 
1993 193.75 2005 1590.92 
1994 255.41 2006 1942.29 
1995 314.90 2007 2528.88 
1996 321.64 2008 3120.32 
1997 317.84 2009 3623.20 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
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Figure 2 shows that China’s investment in real estate has gone through 2 time periods: slow 
development with small fluctuation from 1988 to 1997 and rapid increase from 1998 to 
2009. Real estate’s steady growth in the second period relates to the release of housing 
consumption after the urban housing system reform in 1992. 
Figure 2:  China’s investment in real estate (1988~ 2008) unit: billion RMB 
 
From Table 3, we see that the total amount of real estate investment in China has reached 
3623.2 billion RMB in 2009, which increased by 14.2% compared to the previous year. 
Stable market growth in the future is possible, but there are still factors of uncertainty 
which might lead to short-term shocks, stagnation or recession, because the problem of 
bubbles in some cities is serious (Li, 2008). 
3.3.2. The Investment Ratio of Real Estate to GDP 
The ratio of real estate to fixed assets investment and to GDP is an indicator for judging the 
reasonability of the scale of real estate investment. According to Cao (2009), the ratio of 
real estate investment to GDP in European and American countries has an average value 
between 4% and 5%, which may be taken as reference for China. Table 4 shows that 
China’s real estate investment accounts for less than 10% of gross fixed investment before 
1993 and for less than 4% of total GDP; this proportion is relatively low, which indicates a 
shortage of real estate investment and real estate products supply. From 1993 to 1995, 
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investment in real estate accounts for more than 14% of gross fixed investment, for more 
than 5% of total GDP; the real estate market is marked by excess of supply over demand 
and serious housing vacancy rate. 
Table 4: The ration of real estate investment to fixed assets investment and GDP (1999 -2008)  
Unit: billion RMB 
Year 
Total 
Investment 
in Real 
Estate (1) 
Total 
Investment 
in Fixed 
Assets (2) 
GDP (3) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(3) 
1990 25.33 451.7 1866.78 5.60% 1.36% 
1991 33.62 559.45 2178.15 6.00% 1.54% 
1992 73.12 808.01 2692.35 9.00% 2.72% 
1993 193.75 1307.23 3533.39 14.80% 5.48% 
1994 225.41 1704.21 4819.79 15.00% 5.30% 
1995 314.9 2001.93 6079.37 15.70% 5.18% 
1996 321.64 2291.35 7117.66 14.00% 4.52% 
1997 317.84 3068.79 7897.3 13.71% 4.02% 
1998 361.42 3432.1 8440.23 10.53% 4.28% 
1999 410.32 2985.47 8967.71 13.74% 4.58% 
2000 498.41 3291.77 9921.46 15.14% 5.05% 
2001 634.41 3721.35 10965.52 17.05% 5.79% 
2002 779.09 4349.99 12033.27 17.91% 6.47% 
2003 1015.38 5556.66 13582.28 18.27% 7.48% 
2004 1315.83 7047.74 15987.83 18.67% 8.23% 
2005 1590.92 7507.82 18321.74 21.19% 8.68% 
2006 1940.29 10999.82 21192.35 17.64% 9.16% 
2007 2528.88 13732.39 25730.56 18.42% 9.83% 
2008 3120.32 17282.84 30067 18.05% 10.38% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
But after 1996, China’s real estate turned to a period of relatively stable development while 
the government took the coordination between real estate investment and national 
economic development into account and embarked on regulation of real estate investment. 
In the period of 1996 to 1999, the share of real estate investment in GDP is between 10% 
and 14%, of gross fixed investment in GDP between 4% and 5%. Using reverse derivation 
of the housing vacancy rate, Luo (2005) believed that the investment ratio of real estate in 
this period was in its optimal range in the light of specific conditions in China and 
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experience of European and American countries. 
Since 2000, the proportion of real estate investment in GDP exceeds 5% and in gross fixed 
investment more than 14%, indicating that China’s real estate investment has exceeded the 
upper bound of the optimal interval. China’s real estate investment has been running at a 
high level and its scale is bigger than normal.  
3.3.3. Growth Rate of Housing Price  
Housing price is an important determinant in the operation of real estate market, and it is 
also an indicator reflecting the rationality of real estate investment. According to the law of 
supply and demand, the relation of supply and demand depends on the market price of 
commodities. A rapid growth of housing prices usually denotes a shortage of supply. 
Although real estate industry has its own specific characteristics, it should also obey the 
supply and demand law.  
Table 5 shows that the selling price of both commercialized and residential buildings have 
steady growth in the most recent decade. The average selling price of commercialized 
buildings in 2007 reached 3864 RMB, with a growth rate of 14.77%; the selling price of 
residential buildings reached 3645RMB, with a growth rate of 16.86%. The total selling 
price of commercialized buildings from 2003 to 2007 has doubled relative to the period of 
1997 to 2003, while the selling price of residential buildings has tripled. In 2008, both 
selling prices have small decreases, reflecting that bubbles in some areas might have been 
squeezed out. 
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Table 5: Average selling price of commercialized and residential buildings (1997-2008) 
   Unit: RMB 
Year 
Average Selling 
Price of 
Commercialized 
Buildings per m² 
(1) 
Average Selling 
Price of 
Residential 
Buildings per 
m²(2) 
Growth Rate 
of  (1) 
Growth Rate 
of  (2) 
1997 1997 1790 10.85% 11.53% 
1998 2063 1854 3.30% 3.58% 
1999 2053 1857 -0.48% 0.16% 
2000 2112 1948 2.87% 4.90% 
2001 2170 2017 2.75% 3.54% 
2002 2250 2092 3.69% 3.72% 
2003 2359 2197 4.84% 5.02% 
2004 2778 2608 17.76% 18.71% 
2005 3168 2937 14.03% 12.61% 
2006 3367 3119 6.29% 6.21% 
2007 3864 3645 14.77% 16.86% 
2008 3800 3576 -1.66% -1.89% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
As next step we use the House Price to Income Ratio as an indicator to determine the 
presence of housing price bubbles and the rationality of China’s house price. The average 
ratio between housing price and income reflects the degree of housing affordability for the 
local population. The higher the ratio is, the lower is the ability to pay. Once the house price 
to income ratio keeps rising and there is no sign of market shrinkage, this indicates that 
there is a high degree of speculative investment and bubbles existing in the real estate 
market. We use the most common method to calculate the House Price to Income Ratio, 
which is the ratio of the average selling price of residential buildings to annual disposable 
income of urban households per capita. In a formula, this reads as follows: 
R= P*S / I 
where 
R……ratio of house price to income 
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P…… average selling price of residential buildings per m² 
S…… per capita floor space of residential building in urban areas 
I…… per capita annual disposable income of urban households 
Table 6 shows that the house price income ratios R in most years are higher than 6, higher 
than 7 since 2005.With regard to the critical value of the house price income ratios, there is 
no uniform standard in the world. Renaud (1989) reports: 
“In developed countries, the price income ratio is between1.8 and 5.5 to 1; in developing 
countries, the ratio is generally between 4 and 6 to 1, of course, there are exceptions....” 
Thereafter, Renaud (1971) collected more information on house price and residential 
income from a large number of countries and discovered that some developing countries, 
especially countries with socialist economies, have house price to income ratio much higher 
than six-fold. Later, Renaud (1991) revised his views: the housing prices in developed and 
developing countries are in sharp contrast to the ratio of house price to income in socialist 
economies.  
However, most Chinese economists believed in the existence of bubbles in China’s real 
estate industry and pointed out that a critical value of 7.0 is reasonable for China’s real 
estate industry. Table 5 shows that the House Price to Income Ratio is above 7.0 since 2005, 
indicating that there are bubbles in the real estate market and the growth rate of house price 
is much higher than income of urban households as a whole. The higher increase of house 
price lowers residents’ capability to pay for houses. 
  
21 
 
Table 6: China’s ratio of house price to income (1989-2008)             Unit: RMB, % 
Year 
Per Capita 
Annual 
Disposable 
Income of Urban 
Households 
Average Selling 
Price of 
Residential 
Buildings (Yuan 
/m2)  
Per Capital Floor 
Space Of 
Residential 
Building In Urban 
Areas (sq.m) 
R 
1997 5160.3 1790 17.8 6.17 
1998 5425.1 1854 18.7 6.38 
1999 5854.0 1857 19.4 6.16 
2000 6280.0 1948 20.3 6.28 
2001 6859.6 2017 20.8 6.12 
2002 7702.8 2092 22.8 6.19 
2003 8472.2 2197 23.7 6.15 
2004 9421.6 2608 25.0 6.92 
2005 10493.0 2937 26.1 7.31 
2006 11759.5 3119 27.1 7.19 
2007 13785.8 3645 28.1 7.43 
2008 15781.0 3576 29.8 7.05 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
3.4. The structure of Real Estate Investment 
China's real estate investment structure has undergone significant changes since 1997 
(Table 7). The proportion of residential housing investment to total completed investment 
increased from 48.43% in 1997 to 71.92% in 2008. Office building investment and others 
had an obvious decrease while the proportion of business use housing investment didn’t 
change a lot. Generally, the proportion of investment in building Villas and luxury 
apartments was increasing. It reached its highest point of 8.16% in 2004 and after that 
fluctuated within a narrow range of 6.5% to 7.5%. Construction of affordable housing has 
been on a downward trend and fell to 3.11% in 2008, hitting an all-time low. 
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Table 7:  The percentage of investment products to total completed investment (1997-2008) 
Year 
Completed             
Investment         Houses    
This  Residential Villas, Economically Office for Others 
 
Year Buildings High-grade Affordable Buildings Business   
 
  Apartments Housing    Use   
1997 100% 48.43% 4.92% 5.84% 12.24% 13.40% 25.93% 
1998 100% 57.59% 5.03% 7.49% 12.00% 13.17% 17.24% 
1999 100% 64.30% 4.35% 10.65% 8.25% 11.80% 15.64% 
2000 100% 66.45% 5.42% 10.88% 5.98% 11.64% 15.94% 
2001 100% 66.47% 5.83% 9.45% 4.85% 11.91% 16.77% 
2002 100% 67.10% 6.64% 7.56% 4.89% 11.98% 16.03% 
2003 100% 66.74% 6.23% 6.13% 5.01% 12.83% 15.43% 
2004 100% 67.16% 8.16% 4.61% 4.96% 13.10% 14.78% 
2005 100% 68.27% 6.60% 3.26% 4.80% 12.82% 14.12% 
2006 100% 70.22% 7.44% 3.59% 4.78% 12.12% 12.88% 
2007 100% 71.20% 7.15% 3.25% 4.09% 11.02% 13.69% 
2008 100% 71.92% 6.51% 3.11% 3.74% 10.75% 13.59% 
Source:  Calculation according to China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
Overall, investment in residential buildings has become an absolute mainstay of China’s 
real estate investment, which is more in line with governmental direction. However, many 
scholars claim that there is an obvious imbalance in the structure of commercialized 
housing supply. Zhang and Cheng (2008) believed that the proportion of villas and 
high-grade apartment investment is too high while that of economic affordable housing 
investment is too low compared to the living standards in China. They suggest limiting the 
land supply for high-grade flats strictly and focusing more on the development of 
affordable houses.   
China’s economy is objectively divided into three zones: eastern, central and western. The 
eastern region has been rapidly developed while the central and western regions are falling 
behind. In the past decade, the Chinese government committed to develop Central and 
Western China, with the purpose of narrowing the differences between regions, in order to 
achieve the relative balance of Chinese regional economic layout.  
Table 8 is the local distribution of China’s real estate investment from 1996 to 2008.The 
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proportion of real estate investment in the eastern region to the total amount is declining, 
but it is still a larger proportion, compared with central and western regions. Real estate 
investment in both western and central regions were increasing year by year, its growth in 
western is quicker than in central region since 2004.  
Table 8: Local distribution of China’s real estate investment (1996-2008)   Unit: % 
Year Eastern Central Western 
Total 
Amount 
1996 76.15 12.65 11.2 100 
1997 79.63 12.02 8.35 100 
1998 78.56 12.09 9.34 100 
2003 70.68 15.38 13.94 100 
2004 72.37 12.54 15.09 100 
2005 69.21 14.03 16.76 100 
2006 63.9 18.2 17.9 100 
2007 61.87 18.89 19.24 100 
2008 59.92 20.56 19.52 100 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
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4. The influence of China’s Real Estate Development on 
)ational Economic Growth 
Real estate industry, as a pillar industry, can directly or indirectly simulate the development 
of up and downstream industries, especially the growth of residential consumption, due to 
its long industry chain and high correlation degree. The development of real estate industry 
has also made important contribution to the expansion of domestic needs, promotion of the 
development of relevant industries, expansion of employment, acceleration of the national 
economic growth. However, the rapid development of real estate industry could also lead to 
an imbalance in the allocation of social resources and increase the financial risks or even 
influence the healthy development of national economy and its correlated industries 
indirectly.  
4.1 The Input-Output Analysis of China’s Real Estate 
Input-Output Analysis was introduced by Wassily Leontief (1905-1999) in the 1930s, who 
was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciencesfor his development of this 
model in 1973. The method of Input-Output Analysis consists of two parts: the 
Input-Output Table and the Input-Output Model. The latter is a mathematical model built 
based on the former.  
Based on the Input-Output Table of China (2002) published by the State Statistical Bureau 
of China, we calculate the economic impact of China’s real estate industry on its associated 
industries by calculating the direct input-, cumulative input-, influence, and induction 
coefficients. An input-output table presents a detailed analysis of the process of production 
and the use of goods and services and the income generated in that production. This table 
shows, in quantitative terms, the inter-related and mutually dependent economic and 
technological relations among industries. 
4.1.1. Direct Input Coefficients 
The direct input coefficient reflects the basic characteristics of the production structure of 
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the Leontief model, which is the basis for calculating total consumption coefficients. 
Direct Input Coefficients aij (i,j=1,2,…,n), also called technical coefficients, refer to the 
volume of products and services of all sectors (i) consumed directly by a certain sectors 
productive units (j), which are needed for their total output. It represents the direct technical 
economic ties and direct interdependence between the sector and other sectors. 
The method of calculating direct input coefficients is: the total consumption of production 
or service in production and operation of basic sector j directly from the non-basic sector i 
divided by total input of sector j. In a formula, the coefficients are expressed as  
aij=xij/Xj  (i,j=1,2,…,n) 
The Direct Input Coefficient aij represents the degree of interrelation between sector i and 
sector j, The value of aij is between 0 and 1. The bigger aij, the higher is direct demand of 
China’s real estate for other related sectors, and this yields more evidence of direct 
interrelation.  
Table 9: Direct input coefficients of China’s real estate (2002) 
Significantly Driven Sectors Direct Input Coefficients 
Metal Products Manufacturing 0.17 
Building Materials and other non-metallic Mineral 0.10 
Construction 0.10 
Banking and Insurance 0.10 
Machinery and Equipment manufacturing 0.09 
Real Estate and Services 0.05 
Wholesale and Retail trades  0.05 
Transportation, Posts and Telecommunications   0.05 
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.04 
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Through Quantitative analysis on the Matrix of Direct Input Coefficients (42*42 sectors) of 
the Input-Output Table of China (2002), the results showed that there were 36 of 42 sectors 
directly relating to the real estate industry. From these 36 sectors, 10 of them have close 
relation to the real estate industry (Table 9): the Metal Products Manufacturing, Building 
Materials and other Non-metallic Mineral Manufacturing and Construction industries are 
the main direct consumption industries of China’s real estate industry. At the same time, 
the estate industry has strong dependence on the banking and insurance industry because 
the real estate industry itself requires massive capital investment.  
4.1.2. Cumulative Input Coefficients 
Cumulative Input Coefficients bij (i,j = 1,2,…,n) refer to the volume of products and 
services of all sectors (i) consumed directly and indirectly by a certain sector of productive 
units (j), which are needed for their total output. In a formula, these coefficients are 
expressed as 
 
（i,j=1,2,…,n） 
The first term of the equation above aij indicates the direct consumption of sector j for 
sector i; the second term indicates the indirect consumption of sector j for sector i 
in the first round; the third term of the equation  indicates the indirect 
consumption of sector j for sector i in the second round; the fourth term
indicates the indirect consumption in the third round, etc. By analogy, the n+1 term of the 
equation has the indirect consumption in the n round. As the equation shows, the 
Cumulative Input Coefficient is equal to the total amount of direct consumption and 
indirect consumption in certain rounds.  
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The Matrix of Cumulative Input Coefficient can be calculated based on the matrix of direct 
Input Coefficient, using a formula as follows: 
 
Here, A is the matrix of Direct Input Coefficients, I is for the identity matrix and B is for 
the matrix of Cumulative Input Coefficients. 
The Cumulative Input Coefficients is more essential and comprehensive than the Direct 
Input Coefficients to reflect the technical relation between sectors, which is crucial for the 
accuracy of analyzing national economics and industrial structure. Based on the Direct 
Input Coefficients A and the Input-Output Table of China (2002) again and by using the 
above formula, we calculate the Cumulative Input Coefficients and obtain the values shown 
in Table 10. 
Table 10: Cumulative input coefficients of China’s real estate (2002) 
Significantly Driven Sectors Cumulative Input Coefficients 
Metal Products Manufacturing 0.36 
Machinery and Equipment manufacturing 0.29 
Construction 0.23 
Chemical Industry 0.18 
Wholesale and Retail trades  0.14 
Building Materials and other Non-metallic 
Mineral Manufacturing 
0.14 
Transportation, Posts and 
Telecommunications   
0.12 
Other Manufacturing Industries 0.11 
Real Estate and Services 0.10 
According to Table 10, the Metal Products Manufacturing is the most interrelated sectors to 
the real estate industry followed immediately by the industries of manufacturing and real 
estate and services. The night most interrelated industries amount to 1.66, which means that 
every 1 unit of real estate investment lead to 1.66 units output of the most interrelated 
industries.  
IAIB −−= −1)(
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4.1.3. Influence and Induction Coefficients 
Influence Coefficient and induction coefficient are crucial indicators for evaluating the role 
of a given industry in the national economy. When an industry has relative bigger influence 
and induction coefficients, this means that this industry plays a decisive role in the 
development of the economy.  
Influence coefficient reflects the degree that one additional unit used in a given sector 
affecting the production demand for other sectors in the national economy. It is usually 
denotes as , calculated by the formula: 
F =
 	
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Here,	 is the cumulative input coefficient of sector j to sector .   	


	 is the sum of 
columns in the cumulative input coefficients matrix which reflects impact of real estate 
industry on other sectors, the influence coefficient. 
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 is the average value of 
the sum of rows in the cumulative input coefficients matrix. The influence is marked by the 
pulling capacity of real estate investment (j) to national economic development.  
If  > 1, the impact of sector j to other sectors is higher than the average impact ofall of 
the sectors to other sectors in the entire economy; if  = 1, the impact of sector j to other 
sectors is at the average level of impact ofall of the sectors to other sectors in the entire 
economy; if  < 1, the impact of sector j to other sectors is under the average level of 
impact of all of the sectors to other sectors in the entire economy. The bigger the impact 
coefficient is, the bigger the pulling capacity of sector j to economic growth. 
Induction coefficient reflects the induction level of demand for a given sector (the output 
provided by a given sector for other sectors’ production) while increasing use of an 
additional unit in all sectors in the national economy. It is usually denoted as 	, calculated 
by the formula 
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Here, 	 is the cumulative input coefficient of sector j to sector .  	


  is the sum of 
rows in the complete partition coefficient matrix which reflects the degree of sector  felt 
the effects of other sectors, the induction coefficient.  
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  is the average value 
of the sum of rows in the complete partition coefficient matrix. Induction coefficient is 
marked by the pushing capacity of sector i to the national economic development. 
If 	 > 1, the induction degree of other sectors from sector  is higher than the average 
level of all of the sectors from other sectors in the entire economy; if 	 = 1, the induction 
degree of other sectors from sector  is at the average level of all of the sectors from other 
sectors in the entire economy; if 	 < 1 , the induction degree of other sectors from sector 
 is under the average level of all of the sectors from other sectors in the entire economy; 
the bigger the induction coefficient, the bigger is the pushing capacity of sector to national 
economic development.  
After the calculation and analysis of impact and induction degree of China’s real estate 
industry by using the Input-Output Table of China (2002) again, we find that the pull- and 
push effects are below the average level when compared to other 41 sectors. The influence 
coefficient in simple form is 0.66 in the 41
st
 place of 42 sectors and in weighted form is 
1.27 in the 11
th
 place; the induction coefficient in simple form is 0.62 in the 28th place and 
in weighted form is 1.03 in the 16
th
 place. The total driving effects amounted to 1.28 in 
simple form and 2.3 in weighted form.  
4.1.4. Conclusions 
The backward pull, forward push and indirect effects extend the industrial chain of the real 
estate industry and enlarge the attack surface of the national economy. In general, the 
pulling function of the real estate industry to other industries is greater than the push 
function, which indicates that the growth model of real estate development is pulling 
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oriented in China. However, its ability to pull and push the national economy is not very 
powerful, because by the method calculated in simple form, the driving effect together has 
the sum of 1.28. This shows that the driving effect of China’s real estate industry is below 
the average level compared to other 43 sectors. If we consider its added value in 
construction industry and calculate it in weighted form, the driving effect of real estate 
industry has the sum of 2.3, placing a relatively higher position in the rankings. 
Structurally, about half of industries interrelated with the real estate industry in the national 
economy have a higher degree than the intermediate level and most of them are both 
forward and backward interrelated. Computing results show that there are 20 industries 
significantly interrelated with real estate industry, in which 12 industries have both forward 
and backward relation with the real estate industry. Banking and insurance industry has the 
closest interrelation with the real estate industry, forward and backward synchronously, 
which shows the high degree of their mutual influence and interdependence and the real 
estate development is inseparable from the support of the banking and insurance industry, 
but plays a role in promoting the further prosperity of the latter. 
4.2. Quantitative Analysis of Real Estate Investment and Economic 
Growth based on Co-integration Theory 
4.2.1. Basic Data 
To examine the economic effects of investment in real estate development, we choose the 
GDP as a representative indicator for a country’s goods and services. Because the Chinese 
real estate industry started only recently, we can only select the new real estate 
development and investment data to represent the characteristics of China’s stage of the real 
estate industry, with a time series span of 1986 to 2008. We denote the real estate 
development and investment as “REINV” and the GDP as “GDP”. The data used here are 
from China Statistical Yearbook (2009), using the CPI index and GDP deflator to modify 
the data. At the same time, we logarithmize the data, LNREINV and LNGDP, to eliminate 
the impact of heteroscedasticity. 
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Table 11：China’s GDP and real estate completed investment (REINV)    
unit: billion RMB 
Year REINV GDP  CPI GDP Deflator 
1986 10.1 1027.52 1.065 1.047 
1987 14.99 1250.86 1.073 1.052 
1988 25.72 1504.28 1.188 1.121 
1989 27.23 1699.23 1.18 1.085 
1990 25.33 1866.78 1.031 1.058 
1991 33.62 2178.15 1.034 1.068 
1992 73.12 2692.35 1.064 1.082 
1993 193.75 3533.39 1.147 1.151 
1994 255.41 4819.79 1.241 1.206 
1995 314.9 6079.37 1.171 1.137 
1996 321.64 7117.66 1.083 1.064 
1997 317.84 7897.3 1.028 1.015 
1998 361.42 8440.23 0.992 0.991 
1999 410.32 8967.71 0.986 0.987 
2000 498.41 9921.46 1.004 1.021 
2001 634.411 10965.52 1.007 1.021 
2002 779.092 12033.27 0.992 1.006 
2003 1015.38 13582.28 1.012 1.026 
2004 1315.83 15987.83 1.039 1.069 
2005 1590.92 18308.48 1.018 1.038 
2006 1942.292 21192.35 1.015 1.036 
2007 2528.884 25730.56 1.048 1.074 
2008 3120.319 30067 1.059 1.072 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1986- 2009) 
4.2.2. Unit Root Test 
If the two variables, LNGDP and LNREINV, are non-stationary time series, spurious 
regression may exist. Hence, unit-root tests are needed to find out whether the variables are 
stationary.  
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Table 12: China’s GDP and real estate completed investment after CPI, GDP-deflator modification 
and logarithm 
 Year REINV             
(1986 as basis) 
GDP                
(1986 as basis) 
LNREINV LNGDP 
1986 10.1 1027.52 2.3125 6.9349 
1987 13.97 1189.03 2.6369 7.0809 
1988 20.17 1275.58 3.0042 7.1512 
1989 18.11 1328.01 2.8965 7.1914 
1990 16.33 1378.97 2.7930 7.2291 
1991 20.96 1358.35 3.0426 7.2140 
1992 42.86 1721.06 3.7579 7.4507 
1993 99 1962.37 4.5951 7.5819 
1994 105.2 2219.58 4.6559 7.7051 
1995 110.76 2462.30 4.7074 7.8088 
199.6 104.46 2709.43 4.6488 7.9045 
1997 100.42 2961.78 4.6094 7.9935 
1998 115.1 3194.14 4.7458 8.0691 
1999 132.53 3438.47 4.8868 8.1428 
2000 160.36 3725.92 5.0774 8.2231 
2001 202.69 4033.30 5.3117 8.3023 
2002 251 4399.64 5.5255 8.3893 
2003 323.16 4840.15 5.7781 8.4847 
2004 403.01 5329.64 5.9990 8.5810 
2005 478.62 5879.81 6.1709 8.6793 
2006 575.58 6569.47 6.3554 8.7902 
2007 715.09 7426.71 6.5724 8.9128 
2008 833.17 8095.48 6.7252 8.9991 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1986- 2009) 
Figure 3 is a time plot of LNREINV and LNGDP. Both variables have upward trends over 
time. Therefore we choose the test type of Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and include 
the options of intercept terms and trend. The results are summarized in Table 13:  
 
 
 
33 
 
Figure 3: Timing diagram of LNREINV and LNGDP 
 
In Table 13, c, t, p stands respectively for intercept items, trend and length of lags. In 
general, if the time series is fluctuating around the mean value of 0, intercept (c) and trend 
(t) should not be considered in the test equation; if the series don’t have the mean value of 0 
and without time trend, only intercept (c) is considered in the test equation; if the series 
moves up and down over time, the intercept term (c) and trend (t) should be elected. The (p) 
values are determined based on AIC (Akaike Info Criterion), SC (Schwarz Criterion) and 
HQ (Hannan-Quinn criteria), by searching for smallest value of them. “0” stands for no 
trend or no lags, “ ” stands for the first differentiation of time ser△ ies, here for first 
difference. 
Table 13: Unit root rest results 
Variable LNREINV LN GDP △LN REINV △LN GDP 
ADF T-Statistics -2.279894 -2.941972 -3.627344 -4.331728 
Critical Value (5%) -3.673616 -3.644963 -3.02997 -3.012363 
AIC -0.664498 -3.402905 -0.475159 -3.152719 
SC -0.366254 -3.203948 -0.276330 -3.053241 
HQ -0.614023 -3.359726 -0.441509 -3.131130 
Test Forms (c,t,p) (c,t,3) (c,t,1) (c,0,2) (c,0,0) 
Results non-stationary non-stationary stationary stationary 
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As the results in the table show, the time series LNREINV and LNGDP are both non 
stationary but their first difference LNREINV and LNGDP have become stationary △ △
(the t-statistic is smaller than the critical value at 5% significance level), which indicates 
that both time series are first order integrated I (1). This fulfilled the premise of 
co-integration test and we go to a further step of testing whether there is a long-run 
equilibrium relationship between real estate investment and GDP growth.  
4.2.3. Co-integration Test (Johansen) 
In order to examine whether there was co-integration relationship between China’s real 
estate investment and GDP, it is meaningful to conduct a co-integration test such as 
Johansen Co-integration Test. Both time series of LNREINV and LNGDP are first-order 
integrated, satisfying the premise of doing Johansen Co-integration Test for them. The test 
results are shown in Table 14. 
Table 14: Cointegration Test Result 
Date: 03/06/12   Time: 12:03   
Sample (adjusted): 1990 2008   
Included observations: 19 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend  
Series: LNGDP LNREINV     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 3  
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  
     
     Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     None *  0.586315  16.87517  15.49471  0.0308 
At most 1  0.005502  0.104819  3.841466  0.7461 
     
      Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
     
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
     
     Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
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     None *  0.586315  16.77035  14.26460  0.0197 
At most 1  0.005502  0.104819  3.841466  0.7461 
     
      Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
     
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):  
     
     LNGDP LNREINV    
-29.08467  15.09400    
 5.952956 -1.962995    
     
          
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):   
     
     D(LNGDP)  0.018872 -0.000219   
D(LNREINV)  0.020903 -0.004986   
     
          
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood  77.07036  
     
     Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses) 
LNGDP LNREINV    
 1.000000 -0.518968    
  (0.00961)    
     
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
D(LNGDP) -0.548882    
  (0.14141)    
D(LNREINV) -0.607945    
  (0.60922)    
     
     
The results in Table 14 suggest that there is one cointegrating equation between the real 
estate industry and GDP. Based on this finding, we continue our analysis to seek for the 
dynamic relations between the two variables in the short and long term by using the Vector 
Error Correction Model.  
4.2.4. VEC (Vector Errors Correction) Model 
Engle and Granger (1987) point out that a linear combination of two or more non stationary 
series may be stationary. The stationary combination may be interpreted as a co-integration 
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relationship between the variables. A VEC model is based on VAR model and is a model 
that restricts the long run behavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their 
long-term equilibrium relationships and allow short-term dynamics.  
Consider the relationship between real estate investment (LNREINV) and GDP (LNGDP) 
in a simple VEC model 
∆ =  (! − #LNGDP!) + *,   > 0 
∆,-. = − /(! − #LNGDP!) + */, / > 0, 
where* and */  are stationary terms, but usually not white noise disturbances.  and  / 
denote the speed of adjustment parameters.    and  / are positive parameters, λ is also 
positive in this application. The co-integrating term ! − #LNGDP! is the 
error correction term, which corrects the deviation from long run equilibrium gradually 
through short run adjustments.  LNREINV and LNGDP are the two endogenous variables. 
Based on VEC Model, we implement the Vector Error Correction Estimates by using 1 to 3 
as lags interval for D (Endogenous), in order to test long-run reaction of both variables. The 
obtained results are shown in Table 15.  
Table 15: Results of VEC Estimates 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates 
 Date: 03/06/12   Time: 12:47 
 Sample (adjusted): 1990 2008 
 Included observations: 19 after adjustments 
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ] 
   
   Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1  
   
   LNGDP(-1)  1.000000  
   
LNREINV(-1) -0.518968  
  (0.00961)  
 [-54.0071]  
   
C -5.517965  
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Error Correction: D(LNGDP) D(LNREINV) 
   
   CointEq1 -0.548882 -0.607945 
  (0.14141)  (0.60922) 
 [-3.88159] [-0.99790] 
   
D(LNGDP(-1)) -0.983415 -1.721228 
  (0.16717)  (0.72024) 
 [-5.88259] [-2.38980] 
   
D(LNGDP(-2)) -0.767555 -4.338927 
  (0.26406)  (1.13765) 
 [-2.90675] [-3.81393] 
   
D(LNGDP(-3))  0.534561  0.833382 
  (0.39721)  (1.71133) 
 [ 1.34577] [ 0.48698] 
   
D(LNREINV(-1))  0.171301  0.854330 
  (0.11029)  (0.47518) 
 [ 1.55313] [ 1.79790] 
   
D(LNREINV(-2)) -0.094744 -0.212225 
  (0.05204)  (0.22419) 
 [-1.82070] [-0.94662] 
   
D(LNREINV(-3)) -0.088836 -0.075892 
  (0.03319)  (0.14301) 
 [-2.67630] [-0.53068] 
   
C  0.210706  0.571429 
  (0.06889)  (0.29681) 
 [ 3.05845] [ 1.92521] 
   
    R-squared  0.876998  0.903212 
 Adj. R-squared  0.798723  0.841620 
 Sum sq. resids  0.004940  0.091700 
 S.E. equation  0.021192  0.091304 
 F-statistic  11.20417  14.66434 
 Log likelihood  51.46043  23.71003 
 Akaike AIC -4.574782 -1.653687 
 Schwarz SC -4.177123 -1.256028 
 Mean dependent  0.095142  0.201511 
 S.D. dependent  0.047237  0.229424 
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 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.07E-06 
 Determinant resid covariance  1.03E-06 
 Log likelihood  77.07036 
 Akaike information criterion -6.217933 
 Schwarz criterion -5.323201 
   
   
The VECM uses 3 lags. The second part is the estimated coefficient value of VEC model, 
where CointEq1 stands for error correction term. Besides, Eviews also gives corresponding 
standard deviation and t-statistics of every variable.  
e= LNGDP-0.52LNREINV-5.52 
LNGDP=0.52LNREINV+5.52+e 
In the long-run, 1 unit of real estate investment causes a 0.52 units change of economic 
growth, indicating a significant effect of real estate investment on economic growth, which 
is equivalent to the results of other former studies that we mentioned.  
In the short-run, real estate investment lagged in one period has a positive effect on 
economic growth and real estate investment lagged in two periods has negative effect on 
economic growth. But, the t-statistics for both are not significant，which are 1.56 and -1.82 
respectively. (The t-statistic is not significant when the t-value is between -1.95 to 1.95). 
Real estate investment lagged in three periods has negative effects on economic growth and 
it is significant.  
In Table 15, the first row in the second part shows that the t-statistics for LNGDP is 
significant, which means that this variable can make the whole system go back to the 
equilibrium when deviation of the equilibrium happens.  
4.2.5. Impulse Response Analysis  
Figure 4 shows that gross domestic product reacts to its own shocks rapidly, increasing by 
more than 0.04 standard deviations. In the third period, the value climbs to about 0.065. 
Thereafter, it starts to decrease, and the reaction becomes weaker and has a light increase 
again from the eighth period. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Response of Real Estate Investment to GDP 
 
A unit real estate investment shock can lead to 0.018 increase of economic growth in the 
first period. In the following three periods, the effect is stable. After that, it follows a 
downward trend till the seventh period and has again a slight increase since the seventh 
period.  
The effect of real estate on economic growth is significant after a delay of two time periods. 
In the long term, the effect is weaker and stable.  
4.2.6. Conclusions 
The test results of VEC Model shows a significant effect of real estate investment and 
economic growth in the long-run and every 1 unit of real estate investment causes a 0.52 
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units change of economic growth. But in the short-run, the influence of real estate 
investment on national economy is not powerful, which is clearly showed in the results of 
the impulse response analysis.   
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5. Problems Exist in China’s Real Estate Industry  
The rapid development of China’s real estate industry, which is still in its growth stage, has 
become more and more important to the national economy, social development and also the 
interests of the masses. There is no doubt that large-scale housing construction has 
significantly improved the housing conditions but also promoted social harmony, social 
stability and social unity.  
However, the development of China’s real estate industry is confronted with many 
problems, due to the limitation of policy implementing system and aberration of policy 
implementing. The non-equilibrium status in China’s real estate market can severely affect 
the healthy development of a harmonious society. Hence, problems need to be found and 
solved immediately.  
5.1. Flaws in Land Policy: Local Governments Dominate the Real Estate 
Market  
Before analyzing the Chinese land policy, it is necessary to have a brief introduction about 
the land ownership in China. The basic land ownership system in China is very different 
from that of most western countries. In western countries, most of the urban land is 
privately owned. The state-owned land is mainly in the range of protected land and the land 
owned by the city government is more in the form of urban public space. However, all of 
the urban land in China is owned by the state. When the urban land is transacted, land 
transfer tax, or called land cost, should be paid to the state. According to the different uses 
of land, the government levies a rent for the use of the land for 50 years or 70 years one 
time, which represents about 30 percent of housing price. As external income, the land 
transfer revenue has become the main source of the local government budget. 
Due to factors such as high land price, huge construction costs of supporting facilities, 
various charges including apportioned charges and incentive of real estate developers have 
made the commercial housing price rise much faster than the price index, representing an 
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annual growth rate of more than 20%. In China, real estate industry is openly 
acknowledged with a profit of 15%, but insiders said it is absolutely exceeding 30% (Wang, 
2006). The high housing prices in China are rooted in the local government-led real estate 
market, which is a deficiency of national land policy. 
Land, as the primary market of real estate, is monopolized by the state and is the source of 
real estate supply in China. From the regular pattern of long-term house pricing, land can 
indeed be considered as the only deciding factor. The poor health in the land market cannot 
avoid the phenomenon of hoarding land and perform an effective land supply, eventually 
leading to distortions in the real estate supply and demand. 
Local governments do not only dominate the layout, element distribution, the total supply, 
preferential policies and transaction costs of real estate market, but also the public opinion, 
policy changes and rules of the game. Because of the ideological land nationalization, the 
local government imposes land resumption on urban residents and on farmers at a low price 
and sells the land at a higher price, thereby reaping huge spreads. According to the Contract 
of State-owned Land Use Right Transfer, local governments share land revenue with the 
central government on a “70/30” split basis and this revenue can be used at the current 
period. Land transaction of local governments are poorly managed by governments at a 
higher level due to the deficiencies of the management system and also because 
governments of higher levels are driven by interest. These factors set incentives to local 
governments to push up house prices greatly.  
Most of the land revenue in the secondary market falls to real estate developers, which 
gives the developers great incentives to participate in land enclosure, hoarding or 
speculation. Furthermore, house prices are increasing continuously in the process of 
speculation. As local governments are responsible for planning the layout of the property 
including land development patterns, building density and other aspects of control, some 
developers have tried every means to amend the Government planning by bribing local 
governments.  
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The relevant government departments and individuals cannot resist the temptation of 
enormous benefits brought by developers and thus modify the pre-planning. Both sides tend 
to get their interests in the real estate development, so that the real estate industry has 
become the most corrupted industry in China's economic system, which is already 
acknowledged. 
5.2. Interest Groups Resist Regulatory Policies of Central Government 
Aimed at the characteristics of high house prices and fast growth, the state and local 
government also proposed control measures. 
Between 2003 and 2004, macro measures aimed to curb over-heated investment in the real 
estate industry. In 2005, the State Council put forward “Eight Control Measures” to 
stabilize the housing price; in 2006, it issued a "National Six Policy" to regulate the 
structure of housing supply. In 2007, the Bank of China and the Banking Commission 
adjusted the credit policy of the commercial housing and stipulated that when one 
purchased the second set (or more) of house, the down payment loan should not be less 
than 40%. In 2008, the State Council issued a notice on dealing with idle land to increase 
land supply from the source. In 2009, the government introduced a series of notices and 
requirements to rectify the market order, to prevent the bubbles from expanding and to 
inhibit the rapid growth of housing price. In 2010, the State Council stipulated the 
prohibition of purchase a third set of house in the cities with high housing prices. In 2011, 
the “New Eight Control Measures” increased the down payment loan up to 60% for the 
second set of house and generally prohibited the purchase of a third set. A series of control 
measures were implemented for the whole country and also for individual provinces or 
cities.  
However, all those controls were unsuccessful in solving the problem and the inflation in 
housing prices is still drastic, a concern of ordinary people. Figures from the National 
Bureau of Statistics show that the housing sales price in 70 large and medium cities in 
China in December 2009 rose by 7.8% over the same period of the previous year, 
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exceeding the highest level since the implementation of monthly statistics on house prices 
in June 2007.  
Despite numerous control measures, the problems of high housing prices, market disorder, 
land hoarding, the creation of land shortage by developers, reselling and connivance of 
government departments in some areas remained serious.  
In my opinion, one fundamental reasons for the ineffective implementation of central 
policies that the objective of local governments and the central government is often not 
consistent: 
For central government, housing price reduction is a political issue and macroeconomic 
regulation on real estate market is based on the people’s interests. But for local 
governments, especially local officials, their performance is evaluated by central 
government through the yielded GDP. Any measures that can enhance economic growth 
and GDP naturally become the local governments’ options for policy. In this regard, 
pushing up housing prices is relatively easier than promoting the development of industry 
and agriculture. That’s why local officials inevitably will lead to lower effectiveness of 
central policies’ implementation. 
Another fundamental reason comes from the real estate market. The pattern of competing 
interests is between real estate developers and home buyers groups. It is clear that real 
estate developers wish the house prices continue to rise and bring them huge wealth while 
home buyers have also a clear, common objective that is to purchase houses at an 
affordable price. In this game, home buyers are in an inferior position because on the one 
hand developers unite interest groups to lobby the government, on the other hand 
developers’ interest and the interest of local government is relatively consistent. Although 
home buyers are the majority, their interest demand cannot get a valid expression and the 
government cannot feel pressure from them. 
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5.3. Flawed Housing Security System  
From the experience of developed countries, low-rent public housing, economic and 
suitable houses or other affordable houses are possible ways to solve the housing problem 
of the low-income population. However, in the current housing supply system of China, the 
main supply channel is the commercial housing supply system. The policies of low-rent 
public houses and economic and suitable houses in fact are not implemented radically in 
China, which leads to the phenomenon that people with high or low income alike must 
purchase commercial houses at an exceptionally high price to meet their housing needs.  
China focuses too much on the "sale-based" housing policies, which directly leads to small 
quantity and slow growth of low-rent housing and economic and suitable houses 
construction. In terms of performance and financial returns, the development and 
construction of them doesn’t benefit the local governments much. Moreover, the 
development of low-rent public houses is a costly and long-period project, especially its 
characteristic as social welfare supply, reducing the enthusiasm for local governments to 
investment. In short, the local governments are afraid of that their own interests would be 
impaired by developing low-rent and economic and affordable houses, because tax and fee 
income from regular commercial houses development is an important part of their financial 
revenue.  
According to the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of China, by the end 
of 2006, 78% of the nation’s total of 657 cities in China has established a low-rent housing 
system. However, only 2% of Chinese families had benefited from the low-cost housing 
system which indicates that the implementation of low-cost housing policy is slow and 
deficient. Capital shortage was the major reason of the inefficient implement of low-rent 
housing construction plan. Figures from the Housing Security Plan of China (2009) showed 
that 2.34 billion RMB was invested in 2006, 5.1 billion RMB in 2007 and 6.8 billion RMB 
in 2008. There was at least 65 billion RMB needed for house construction from 2009 to 
2011 to solve housing problem of more than 7.47 million low-income households.  
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In addition, on July 14, 2006, the government has put forth a policy to arrange a certain 
proportion of net income from land transaction to invest in the low-rent housing 
construction, but the policy hasn’t been effectively implemented. In the cities where it was 
implemented, capital used for low-rent housing construction accounted 5% to 10% of the 
local governments’ revenue from land transaction (Li, 2008), which was significantly small 
when compared to the 70% distribution of local governments from land transaction 
revenue.  
Building economic and suitable houses is another policy adopted by the Chinese 
government and started in 1998. Unlike the low-rent houses which are rented and not sold, 
the economic and suitable houses refer to the commercial houses sold with meager profits 
for the low-income population. From 1999 to 2001, they reached their peak period of 
construction, the proportion of investment allocated to this type of housing to investment in 
commercial housing reached 19% on average (Figure 5). It even reached more than 50% in 
some cities, playing an important role in solving the housing problem for low-income 
families (Li, 2008). However, there were also still underlying problems with the economic 
and suitable houses supply:  
Figure 5: The growth of economic and suitable houses investment unit: % 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
Since 2001, China’s economic and suitable houses investment experienced negative growth. 
The ratio of economic and suitable housing investment to the nation’s total investment for 
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residential houses dropped from 9.45% in 2001 to 3.11% in 2008; the floor space of 
economic and suitable houses sold declined from17.94% in 2001 down to 5.5% in 2008 
(Figure 5).  
The major reason for the small total supply is that the government emphasized too much on 
market-based instruments to solve the housing problem and their initiative in allotting 
special land for affordable houses construction was low. The lack of strict examination on 
the qualification of the beneficiaries led to the participation of high-income groups to invest 
in economic and affordable houses, which not only harmed the interest of low-income 
families but also hinders the further development of economic and affordable houses. In 
addition, the way of construction dominated by real estate developers seriously infected the 
implement of the policy because the center of gravity moved to benefit maximization which 
was realized by lowering construction and building standards, increasing prices of 
economic and affordable houses or lowering the entry qualification for house buyers.  
As a result of the problems stated above, the serious flaw of housing security system make 
urban residents squeezing onto the single plank bridge of the house market, which is also 
one reason why Chinese housing price increases so fast.  
5.4. The Property Tax System Suffers from Drawbacks 
There are two large drawbacks existing in China’s current property tax system: the large 
amount of tax for the real estate development and circulation but little tax in the possession 
stage (Song et al, 2006) On one side, the high tax burden of real estate developers one 
major cause to the high housing prices; the little tax burden in the tenure phase lowers the 
cost of property speculation on the other side.  
The tax burden of real estate industry is higher than any other industries. In 2006, the tax 
burden of real estate enterprises (the proportion of total tax amount to business income) is 
13.4%, much higher than 6.5%, the average tax burden level of all industries (An and Wang, 
2007). Compared to some countries with high taxation on real estate industry, such as the 
USA (6%), Canada (11%), China’s property tax is relatively very high (Liu, 2009). 
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In China’s property tax system, there is unreasonable setting of tax categories. According to 
An and Wang (2007), real estate enterprises have to pay from 60 to 180 taxes and fees for 
real estate construction, varying across cities. During land acquisition, there are 22 taxes 
and fees, including leasehold charge, which alone represents about 30 percent of housing 
price, land management fee, land title tax, city infrastructure fee, relocation compensation 
and business tax. During the construction of houses, at least 20 taxes and fees are levied, 
including city maintenance and construction tax, business tax, education tax and other fees 
and charges for facility in the community. There are also many other fees, which are not 
required by the law, charged by governments at different levels. More than 200 types of 
taxes and fees are charged in some cities but most taxes and fees are not relevant to housing 
(Song et al, 2006). It was estimated that about one third of all fee revenue collected from 
real estate industry in 1998 are not relevant to housing (An and Wang, 2007).  
According to “China Real Estate Industry Research Report 2005”, real estate developers’ 
payment for land plus tax and fee accounts for more than 50 percent of housing price 
compared to 30 to 40 percent of construction cost and 15 to 20 percent of profit.  
In the possession stage of house, home owners don’t need to pay any property tax, which to 
some extents increases the incentive of speculators to hoard houses. Because the cost of 
holding a property is almost zero, there is rare risk for speculators when considering the 
rapid and high appreciation of house value. As a result, a high vacancy rate is observed in 
many large cities of China. Taking the example in Beijing, according to “2004 China Real 
Estate Finance Report” issued by the People Bank of China, 17 percent of residential 
houses purchased in Beijing is aimed at investment and the vacancy rate there even reached 
48 percent of the total number of constructed residential houses. There is no doubt that 
speculation directly leads to the increase of housing prices and harm the interest of ordinary 
residents while zero cost of housing possession has contributed to these problems.  
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5.5. Shortcomings in the Assessing System for Local Governments’ 
Performance  
The reform of the housing system in 1998 makes land a most valuable resource for local 
governments, tax revenues from land automatically has become the best way to make up 
for the financial gap. According to statistics, land cost, fees and tax from housing 
construction and transaction accounted for half of fiscal revenues and half of the housing 
price in some areas (Yi, 2005). Such attractive, huge profits make local governments being 
fascinated by land transaction and houses construction.  
The assessment of local governments’ performance is based on their created GDP, which 
leads to a distortion of land management by local governments. Higher-level governments 
frequently evaluate and punish lower-level officials regarding their performance in GDP, 
tax revenue growth, employment etc. Under the pressure, lower-level government conceals 
information to higher-level government by using the advantage of long information 
delivery chain (Li, 2008). Local governments are keen to concentrate on projects that are 
observable and easy to be observed by higher-level governments, such as building 
high-standard municipal construction or large industrial projects. In addition, by adding the 
factor of term of office (3 or 5 years), the distortion of local governments’ behavior is 
intensified. Because the performance assessment on local governments is aimed at the 
current term of office and land cost is one-time charged for 50 or 70 years use, it is apt to 
cause strong “performance impulse” and myopic behavior. 
Hence, the prices of land and houses directly influence the tax revenue of local 
governments, in other words, the performance of local governments in the assessment 
system. This increases the incentive of local governments to force up land prices and to 
“operate the city” (Yi, 2005).  
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5.6. Real Estate Developers Operate Property Market 
With regard to the land resources available for real estate development, information on real 
estate development costs was not provided by relevant functional government departments 
but by developers and their interest groups (Tao and Peng, 2006). Such one-sided 
information didn’t reflect the real costs and is caused by a lack of authentic information on 
the real estate market. Real estate developers manipulate the housing price information in 
three main dimensions: 
First, real estate developers exaggerate the consequences of regulatory policies to property 
market. Since 2004, in order to meet the country’s macro-control objective, land tightening 
is a fact. However, relevant functional government departments failed to explain the 
community whether land supply shortage was normal or was just a temporary status during 
the time of macro regulations. Besides, the size of gap between total land supply and 
demand was not explained to the community, creating opportunities for developers to make 
false propaganda. Real estate developers fully use the land tightening policy as a big fuss, 
advocating that the tightening policy will inevitably lead to a shortage of housing supply or 
even the shortage of land for constructing residential houses. Suddenly, the entire market is 
in expectation of rapid rise of housing price, non-rational housing consumption and 
speculative housing demand occur.  
Second, real estate developers and interest groups together manipulate the housing price. 
Since 2000, the trend of continuous heating up of real estate industry bring lots of benefits 
to the newspaper media, about one third to an half of whose advertising revenue comes 
from real estate industry (Niu, 2012). In the common interest, real estate developers and the 
media together manipulate the market and mislead the public’s expectation: developers 
employ so-called industry experts and market analysts, usually also government officials, to 
come up with messages that housing price will continue to rise. Their statements, including 
market expectation, will be intensified and exaggerated by newspapers while depression of 
market and statement on housing price decline are lightly mentioned, which has misled the 
public’s expectation.  
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Real estate developers within a region used to work together to create the phenomenon of 
shortage of houses and largely increase the prices but without appropriate supervision of 
the governments. For example, real estate developers in the main city of Chongqing 
municipality jointly increased the house prices by 500 RMB per square meter (+20%) on 
the first day of the Chinese New Year of 2004 (Li, 2008). The sudden increase of house 
prices not only further strengthened the expectation of continuously rising prices and led to 
the explosive growth of real estate sales in Chongqing in the first half of 2004. Many real 
estate developers had no more houses to sell and regretted selling the houses at a low price 
before.  
There are plenty of ways used by property developers to fabricate false information and 
hoodwink the public, such as false housing cost report, hiding excessive profits, 
non-disclosures on the amount of housing sales, and creating the phenomenon of borrowed 
property. Hoarding of unsold houses makes a market with supply shortage, while home 
buyers suffer from asymmetric market information and can do nothing against the random 
price markup. 
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6. Strategies and Recommendations  
6.1. Suggestions on the Formation of the Distribution System of Land 
Transfer Revenue 
As an important step, many scholars and experts are of the opinion to readjust the current 
mechanism of land interest distribution among local governments and central governments, 
in order to establish an effective interest mechanism in both short-term and long-term 
periods. Tao and Peng (2006) suggest that local governments are allowed to take up not 
more than 50% from the land transfer revenues to increase the degree of concentration of 
central finance and curb the impulse of local governments to push up land prices 
substantially. Meanwhile, value added of real estate developers after tax from the secondary 
land market should not be more than 30%, which is aimed to reduce land scarcity, land 
hoarding and speculative land investment. (Gao, 2009). 
The second step is to bring land transfer revenue and expenditure into transparent, open and 
long-term oriented controls. Land transfer fees should be incorporated into local 
government budgets and expenditure management, which will not only increase constraints 
on the use of land transfer fees but also increase the transparency of use. Particularly if the 
current land transfer fees can’t be used for current term, it will greatly reduce the excessive 
impulse of local governments for land selling.  
A reform of the distribution system should also consider helping the evacuees to settle 
down by arranging adequate land compensation fees, resettlement fees and compensation 
for attachments to green crops on the land. Gao (2009) suggests that land compensation 
fees should consist of two parts, one-off and persistent compensations. One-off land 
compensation fees should be about 20 times of average land output value and persistent 
compensation fees include new skill training cost and endowment insurance money for the 
evacuees, which are paid one-time in the land expropriation according to specific criteria in 
different regions. Zhao (2006) even suggests that, during the land expropriation, part of the 
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land (for example, 10%) should be reserved for villages’ use. Landless farmers can together 
use the compensation fees and resettlement fees as a development fund for these 10% 
reserved land, gradually strengthen the collective economy and then achieve the sustainable 
economic development at the village level.  
6.2. Reform of the Housing Security System 
From a policy standpoint, the housing security system is based on three models: embryonic, 
social and comprehensive model (Donnison 1967, Doling 1999). Donnison believes that the 
housing security system with the development of economics will transfer from embryonic 
to social, eventually become comprehensive.  
Housing policy based on the embryonic model is considered as a kind of social 
consumption, instead of production or investment, to meet the demand and need of 
low-income households. This model was mainly implemented by developing countries such 
as Brazil, Mexico, Thailand and India when Donnison advanced this theory. Provisional 
housing measures taken by these countries, however, lack systematic and effective policies 
or implementation capacity.  
The United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Switzerland and most Western European 
countries intervene into the real estate market for the purposes of social development and 
social welfare; therefore classified as the community-based (social model) housing policy. 
Governments have to care for the low-income households, particularly the unemployed, 
single parents and migrant workers, because their living is not satisfied by the real estate 
market due to the non-affordability. Middle- and high-income households are satisfied by 
the real estate market while governments play a role as regulator and controller.  
In both embryonic and social models, governments start to play a role only when housing 
demand cannot be satisfied by the market. In countries like the Netherlands, Germany, 
Sweden and Singapore, governments intervene and control the real estate market in all 
aspects. Donnison categorized these countries as representatives of “comprehensive” in 
terms of their housing systems. Taking the Netherlands as an example, government’s policy 
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is to establish a housing system which not only guarantees the right to housing for 
low-income residents but also protects them from social exclusion without concentration of 
housing construction in certain areas of discrimination; housing policies are set through 
more comprehensive subsidies so that households with different incomes can live in the 
same community. Singapore planned to build massive public houses and rental projects by 
forcing 30% to 40% of the resident’s wage taxed to the statutory provident fund scheme, 
which has made more than 80% of Singaporeans home owners (Shi, 2005). 
In developed countries, the percentage of housing supply from real estate developers of the 
overall housing supply system is about 25% on average, while the proportion of 
low-income housing or housing with security features is very high. In some countries, the 
proportion of public houses has reached over half o to the total housing supply: the United 
States (80%), Singapore (85%), Germany (60%) and the Netherlands (46%). However, 90% 
of housing demands in China were satisfied by property developers (Tian and Zhang, 
2012). 
Based on the current situation, (Tian and Zhang, 2012)suggest that the future choice of 
housing security system for China will be a combination of economic affordable housing-, 
low-rent housing-, common commercial housing and high-grade commercial housing- 
policy, corresponding to different income groups. Common commercial housing supply 
should still be in the dominant position in the housing supply system but the proportion of 
houses at medium and low prices need to be increased. For middle- and high income 
households, their housing demands are satisfied by the market while the government acts 
with regulation and control. At the same time, governments should implement policies of 
economic affordable housing and low-rent housing construction, in order to solve the basic 
housing problem for low-income families. 
However, many problems occur in the implementation process of economically affordable 
housing and low-rent housing policy in recent years, such as unclear definition of recipients, 
enterprise-based security housing construction, small scale of government-subsidized 
houses construction and inadequate location. It needs to be improved and innovated 
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through following aspects: 
First step is to define the recipients for economically affordable housing and low-rent 
housing. Theoretically, the recipients of government subsidized houses are middle and low 
income households who are unable to enter the market for housing purchasing or renting. 
But how to define low-income and middle-income families is a difficult problem. Since 
China has not yet built files of individual incomes declaration and credit, it is difficult to 
find out family income accurately. (Tian and Zhang, 2012) suggests that the recipients can 
be defined by scientific classification of household income levels though quantitative 
analysis of actual income in different regions and establishment of a strict examination, 
registration and consulting system to increase transparency. 
Second step is to adjust the current affordable housing policy. China’s current affordable 
housing policy requires the protection for low- and middle income families. However, the 
vast majority of families in China belong to this category, accounting for 2/3 of the total 
number of urban households (An and Wang, 2007). Expanding the housing security into 
such a large range is uneconomic, especially not practical for a developing country.  This 
explains one of the causes of the huge gap between affordable housing demand and housing 
supply. Therefore, Families at middle and upper income level have their housing needs met 
by the market (An and Wang, 2007).   
Besides, affordable housing construction should be restricted by small apartment 
orientation, which makes recipients easier to buy affordable houses and increases the 
efficiency on utilizing limited housing resources.  
Currently, governmental subsidies on affordable housing provided by the state in terms of 
land allocation, tax relief and other means of support to the housing developers. Some 
unavoidable flaws occur unavoidably in such a way of subsidy, such as the inefficiency of 
the state’s welfare distribution because the developers are hard to monitor by the 
government due to high monitoring costs. Therefore, experts suggested that governments 
on the one hand should distribute financial subsidies directly to low-income individuals and 
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provide discount government loans, loan guarantee and other housing subsidies to 
encourage low-income families to enter the real estate market on the other hand (Li, 2008).  
6.3. Adjustment of the Property Taxation System 
The current property tax system focuses mainly on increasing the burden of real estate 
developers aiming to force the housing price to keep in a reasonable range. However, 
developers could easily switch the increased burden to home buyers and indirectly lead to 
the increase of housing prices. Tax increase in the phase of housing development is not 
propitious for sustainable development of the real estate industry. On the contrary, tax 
collection in the links of housing consumption, tenure and trade can curb speculative 
investment in the real estate market and reduce the high housing prices. (An and Wang 
2007).  
In the consumption link, preferential policies such as tax relief of real estate tax or personal 
income tax should be made for residents’ consumer housing demand but not for investment 
demand. In the links of housing tenure, standardized housing property tax should be 
introduced and levied on the basis of the estimated value of real estate as times goes on and 
the tax rate should be set at a relatively high level for the tenure of a second property so that 
the tax burden becomes a factor needs to be considered for real estate investors. To improve 
the situation of high vacancy rate of land and houses, future land transfer contracts must 
include clear conditions and time requirement for the start and completion of housing 
construction while the introduction of a vacancy tax on land transfer and a mechanism to 
revoke land use right after a certain period of vacancy is necessary (Liu, 2002).  
For speculative investment in real estate, transaction costs should be substantially increased 
by raising transaction tax rate, business tax rate and income tax rate, which helps to 
significantly reduce investors’ earnings. 
Li (2008) suggests establishing an annual rent system for land to replace the existing 
one-time charge for six or seven decades of land-leasing. This is believed to significantly 
reduce the proportion of land price to the housing cost, thereby reduce the price of 
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commercial houses. Cities such as Qingdao of Shandong province and Kunshan of Jiangsu 
province have achieved remarkable results on the first trial of annual land rent system.  
6.4. Improvement of Statistical Methods  
Vacancy rate is the most important indicator for judging the existence of bubbles in the real 
estate industry. China’s vacancy rate of commercial housing is obtained by the ratio of 
reported total floor space of vacant commercial house to the total commercial housing 
supply of the past three years. This way of vacancy rate calculation can only reflect an 
increment of vacant houses, but not objectively the total amount of existing commercial 
houses.  
Hence, China’s housing vacancy rate calculation should draw on the common computing 
formula of most developing countries: housing vacancy rate is the percentage of total floor 
space of vacant commercial house to the total floor space of all existing houses; the total 
floor space of vacant houses include houses that are unrented for more than one year or 
houses that are unsold for more than 2 years after their complement (Li, 1999). It is also 
necessary to add up basic data of vacant houses such as types, unit, price, location, 
environment and etc. This statistical information should be released to the public regularly.  
The growth of real income and disposable income per capita are basic data to determine the 
trend of housing price. However, income data provided by statistical department mostly 
include only the wage of workers but do not include subsidies, bonus and housing 
accumulation funds, which is not an accurate response to real income (Bao, 1999). 
Therefore, it will be difficult to make scientific judgment for the trend of urban housing 
price if residents’ real income is not transparent.  
6.5. Establishment of Mandatory Information Disclosure System 
In China, home buyers have no direct access to the information on land supply and land 
price fluctuation because of the lack of the disclosure system. Some real estate developers 
disclose false information to hide their profits and even work with their interest groups to 
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manipulate the real estate system.  
To solve the problem of asymmetric information distribution for home buyers and help 
them to purchase houses rationally, Xiao (2005) recommended that local government 
should give access to their plans of land supply to the public monthly including actual 
trading volume, structure, space layout, different selling price and other information on 
land supply. The scope of mandatory information disclosure system should also include 
plot ratio, rate of green coverage, construction and installation costs, costs of green 
coverage facilities, various taxes and fees, profit margins and so on, in order to achieve the 
objectives of open and transparent market operation.  
Besides, the establishment of an effective criminal and civil compensation system is 
urgently needed, which should clearly define judicial procedures for different violations 
and should form an effective accountability and disciplinary mechanisms, legally obliging 
developers to disclose information. Media that help real estate developers to disclose false 
information shall be prosecuted for their joint and several liability and civil liability, 
suppressing the collusion of the media and developers to manipulate the market. The 
formulation of laws and regulations alone cannot assure the transparency of information 
disclosure in the real estate market, they must be executed with absolute strictness. Not 
only the government should monitor their execution effectively, but also self-regulatory 
organizations in the real estate industry and social forces should play a necessary and 
complementary role (Li, 2008).   
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